

# Historical formation and types of corruption

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## Abstract

**Purpose:** This study aims to examine the dangerous manifestations of corruption in state and public governance, identify its primary forms, and explore mechanisms for prevention and control based on international best practices.

**Research Methodology:** The research employs synergistic, dialectical, analytical, and comparative methods, alongside generalization, synthesis, and retrospective analysis, to classify corruption types and evaluate their socio-economic impacts.

**Results:** Findings reveal that corruption manifests prominently through state capture, business capture, bribery, patronage networks, and lobbying. Bribery, as both an economic incentive and a means of cost reduction, is identified as one of the most pervasive and damaging practices, undermining institutional trust, eroding legality, and fostering negative economic selection mechanisms. Preventive measures such as integrity standards in public service and competitive remuneration are found to mitigate risks effectively.

**Conclusion:** Corruption operates as both a structural and behavioral phenomenon that distorts governance, weakens legal frameworks, and promotes inequity. Combating it requires systemic reforms, enhanced transparency, societal oversight, and the institutionalization of integrity norms.

**Limitations:** The study focuses primarily on theoretical analysis and classification, with limited empirical validation from case-specific data.

**Contribution:** This research enriches the academic discourse on corruption by integrating a classification framework with socio-economic impact assessment, offering policy-relevant insights for anti-corruption strategies in governance systems.

**Keywords:** *Bribery Practices, Corruption Classification, Government Integrity, Lobbying Activities, Public Service Ethics*

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## 1. Introduction

In the world science system, a large-scale research is carried out aimed at suppressing corruption factors in all spheres of state and society building. Work is being consistently carried out to improve the system of assessment of corruption risks arising in the performance of their duties and functions, as well as to introduce standards of honesty in the public service. Practical approaches and theoretical analysis, such as the prevention and combating of corruption, the development of preventive mechanisms, remain an urgent problem requiring scientific and logical approaches. To carry out the functions of ensuring the functioning of society, officials are given a number of powers, including the disposal of public material and intangible resources. However, such authority alienates officials from the rest of society, making it a special corporate stratum with special interests (Ribeiro, Alves, Martins, Lenzi, & Perc, 2018; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Ruan & Wang, 2023).

At the same time, weakened control by society allows the corporate layer thus created to legitimize the benefits that have arisen, as well as imposes on society the idea of its legitimacy. The most negative consequence of this situation will be the shift of the protection of interests from the public to the corporate side. The main interest is to maintain and increase the number and quality of privileges of the dominant strata. The phenomenon described above is not unique to a single political system or historical period; rather, it represents a recurring pattern in governance structures where power is concentrated and oversight is weak. In such an environment, officials and political elites can develop self-reinforcing networks of influence, using their positions to entrench privileges, accumulate resources, and control decision-making processes. This concentration of authority often leads to the institutionalization of informal norms that normalize favoritism, patronage, and opaque transactions. Over time, these practices may erode public trust and foster a culture of impunity, where ethical breaches are tolerated or even expected as part of the political process (Ermalinda & Benu, 2025; Sanjaya, 2025; Simpser, 2025; Widodo, 2025).

In the absence of robust accountability mechanisms, the gap between the governing elite and the general population widens. Citizens may come to perceive state institutions as serving the interests of a narrow circle rather than the collective good. This perception undermines the legitimacy of public authorities and weakens the social contract, potentially leading to disengagement, civic apathy, or even social unrest. Moreover, when corporate or political elites succeed in legitimizing their privileges through legislation, regulatory frameworks, or state propaganda, the barriers to reform become more entrenched. International experience demonstrates that combating such systemic corruption requires not only legal and administrative reforms but also cultural and societal shifts. For instance, the establishment of independent anti-corruption agencies, transparent procurement systems, and open access to government data can reduce opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. However, these measures must be accompanied by civic education programs that empower citizens to recognize and resist corrupt practices. Without active public participation, institutional reforms may remain superficial, easily circumvented by entrenched interests (Aksinudin, Wiyono, & Nariswari, 2022; Heliany, Asmadi, Sitingjak, & Lubis, 2023; Xu & Xu, 2024).

From an economic perspective, the corporate capture of state functions can distort market competition and hinder sustainable development. When business actors gain undue influence over regulatory and fiscal policies, they can secure monopolistic advantages, restrict market entry for competitors, and divert public resources toward unproductive uses. Such distortions reduce overall economic efficiency, discourage innovation, and perpetuate income inequality (Naumov, 2007). The resulting inequities further weaken public confidence in the fairness of the economic system, reinforcing the cycle of corruption. Sociologically, the division between the privileged elite and the broader society can foster resentment and social fragmentation. As public resources are diverted to serve private interests, essential public goods such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure may suffer from underinvestment. This resource misallocation exacerbates poverty and limits opportunities for upward mobility, creating a feedback loop in which marginalized groups have fewer means to challenge the status quo. Over time, the persistence of such inequalities can weaken national cohesion and fuel political instability (Canen & Wantchekon, 2022; Khan, 2021).

A critical factor in addressing these challenges is the enhancement of institutional transparency and citizen oversight. Mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, whistleblower protections, and independent media can provide the public with tools to monitor government actions and hold officials accountable. Furthermore, fostering ethical leadership within the public service—through merit-based recruitment, competitive salaries, and professional development—can reduce the temptation for officials to misuse their authority (Canen & Wantchekon, 2022; Chirozva, 2021). Ultimately, the battle against entrenched corporate and political privilege requires a multi-dimensional strategy that addresses both structural and behavioral dimensions of corruption. Legislative reforms must be complemented by a transformation in political culture, where integrity, accountability, and service to the public are valued over personal gain. This transformation cannot be achieved overnight; it demands sustained commitment from political leaders, civil society, and the international community. As historical experience suggests, societies that succeed in curbing systemic corruption are those that integrate legal

safeguards, institutional checks, and civic engagement into a coherent and resilient governance framework.

## **2. Literature review and hypothesis development**

At the international level, global governance frameworks, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), provide a platform for harmonizing definitions and enforcement mechanisms. However, the effectiveness of such frameworks depends on domestic political will and the capacity of national institutions to implement agreed-upon standards. Cross-border cooperation is especially important in combating corruption linked to money laundering, tax evasion, and illicit financial flows, which often involve complex networks spanning multiple jurisdictions. The study's methodological pluralism acknowledges that no single approach can fully capture the complexity of corruption. By combining quantitative measures—such as the Corruption Perceptions Index—with qualitative analyses from interviews, ethnographic studies, and legal case reviews, researchers can gain a more nuanced understanding of both the prevalence and the lived experiences of corruption. Finally, the recognition that form and content are interdependent underscores the need for anti-corruption strategies that address both the visible symptoms and the underlying causes. Structural reforms—such as strengthening judicial independence, enhancing public sector wages to reduce incentives for bribery, and promoting civic education must be paired with measures that alter the informal norms sustaining corrupt practices. Only by addressing both dimensions can societies hope to achieve sustained reductions in corruption and the institutional resilience needed to prevent its recurrence (T. B. Sobirovich & Elmuratovna, 2025).

The multidimensional approach adopted in this study highlights the necessity of integrating theoretical rigor with empirical insights in order to address corruption effectively. While many anti-corruption initiatives have focused narrowly on strengthening legal frameworks or introducing technological solutions, the evidence from diverse contexts indicates that such measures alone rarely achieve lasting impact. This is because corruption is not solely a legal infraction; it is also embedded within socio-cultural systems, economic incentives, and political arrangements that can either foster integrity or perpetuate misconduct. For instance, in countries with deeply rooted patron-client systems, legal reforms may be undermined by political actors who rely on informal networks to maintain their influence. In these environments, the introduction of formal rules without corresponding shifts in the underlying power dynamics can lead to what scholars term “isomorphic mimicry,” where institutions adopt the outward appearance of reform while core practices remain unchanged. This phenomenon illustrates why a purely formalistic or surface-level approach is insufficient. Anti-corruption policies must disrupt the entrenched social contracts that normalize unethical behavior (Sakib, 2020; T. Sobirovich, 2025).

From a policy-making perspective, the classification of corruption forms serves as a diagnostic tool for determining where and how to intervene. Petty corruption, often arising from low public sector salaries and bureaucratic inefficiencies, may be reduced through administrative streamlining, increased remuneration, and automation of service delivery. By contrast, grand corruption—particularly that which involves state capture—requires structural interventions such as political finance reform, enhanced transparency in procurement processes, and the insulation of oversight bodies from political interference. Systemic corruption, which permeates all levels of governance, demands a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including robust civil society engagement and sustained international cooperation. Cultural context further complicates the picture. Practices such as *guanxi* in China, *blat* in post-Soviet states, or certain forms of *gotong royong* in Southeast Asia, may blur the boundaries between socially sanctioned reciprocity and corrupt favoritism. In some cultures, refusing a gift may be interpreted as a social slight, potentially harming relationships and undermining trust. Therefore, anti-corruption campaigns must be culturally calibrated to avoid alienating stakeholders while still promoting ethical norms. This necessitates participatory dialogue with community leaders, religious authorities, and professional associations to redefine acceptable practices in ways that align with both cultural traditions and principles of good governance (Peters & Fontaine).

Methodologically, the synergistic framework employed in this study allows for the triangulation of findings from multiple sources. Quantitative data, such as those provided by Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index or the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, offer broad cross-national comparisons (Vander Beken, 2001). However, these indices often fail to capture the everyday realities of corruption at the micro level. To address this gap, qualitative methods—such as ethnographic fieldwork, key informant interviews, and participatory observation—are employed to uncover the nuanced ways in which corruption manifests in different settings. Retrospective analysis further enriches this picture by situating contemporary patterns within their historical trajectories, enabling researchers to identify path-dependent dynamics that may resist reform. Comparative analysis also reveals important lessons. The contrast between Singapore's zero-tolerance approach, which combines high public sector salaries with stringent enforcement, and Italy's struggle with persistent corruption despite extensive legal reforms, underscores the importance of aligning institutional incentives with enforcement capacity. Singapore's model demonstrates that anti-corruption success is not solely about punitive measures; it also involves creating an environment where integrity is materially rewarded and corruption is socially stigmatized. Conversely, Italy's experience highlights the limitations of legal frameworks in the absence of consistent enforcement and public buy-in (Maggio, 2021; Quah, 2016).

The international dimension of corruption control cannot be overstated. Globalized financial systems provide avenues for illicit funds to move quickly across borders, making it essential for countries to collaborate on anti-money laundering measures, asset recovery, and the closure of legal loopholes exploited by transnational actors. Initiatives such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention illustrate the potential for multilateral agreements to set common standards and facilitate cross-border enforcement. However, the effectiveness of these frameworks depends heavily on domestic political will, institutional capacity, and the alignment of international norms with local realities. In designing anti-corruption strategies, it is also important to recognize the interplay between formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions—laws, regulations, and official procedures—are only as effective as the informal norms and values that support or undermine them. If the prevailing informal norms condone bribery or nepotism, formal rules are likely to be circumvented. Therefore, reforms must aim to shift societal attitudes through public education, awareness campaigns, and the promotion of role models who exemplify ethical leadership. Civic education programs, particularly those integrated into school curricula, can help instill values of integrity and public service in the next generation (Boateng, Wang, Ntim, & Elmagrhi, 2024; Nance, 2018).

An additional consideration is the role of technology in both enabling and combating corruption. Digital platforms for public procurement, e-governance portals, and blockchain-based land registries have been deployed in various countries to reduce opportunities for discretionary abuse. Yet technology is not a panacea; it can also be manipulated by corrupt actors if oversight mechanisms are weak. For example, e-procurement systems can still be gamed through collusion among bidders or the manipulation of technical specifications. Thus, technological solutions must be embedded within a broader framework of accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement. Finally, the recognition that corruption is both a cause and consequence of institutional weakness implies that anti-corruption efforts must be sustained over the long term. Short-term gains can easily be reversed if political transitions bring to power actors who benefit from the re-establishment of corrupt networks. Building institutional resilience requires not only legal reforms but also the cultivation of a political culture in which corruption is widely regarded as unacceptable. This involves continuous investment in oversight institutions, the protection of whistleblowers, the free flow of information, and the empowerment of citizens to hold leaders accountable (Davis, Lennerfors, & Tolstoy, 2021).

In sum, the literature and methodological approach outlined in this study point toward an integrated model of anti-corruption policy—one that is adaptive to local contexts, grounded in a clear understanding of the forms and drivers of corruption, and reinforced by both domestic and international partnerships. By combining structural reforms with cultural change, and by aligning formal rules with informal norms, it is possible to make meaningful progress in reducing corruption and enhancing the integrity of public institutions.

### 3. Research methodology

As we have shown, incidents of corruption can play a major role in the functioning of a society. The informal relationships that take place in society affect a huge number of individuals and penetrate into many aspects of social life. In this regard, corrupt practices come in various forms. At the same time, as you know, forms and content reinforce each other. As Hegel put it, “content is nothing more than the transition of form into content, and form is the transition of content into form. That transition is one of the most important definitions”(Hegel, 1990; Mwesigwa, 2021). In this regard, the separation of the manifestations of corrupt practices seems to be a necessary condition for analyzing the essence of corruption. This article employs scientific methods such as synergistic approaches, generalization, dialectical methods, analysis and synthesis, retrospective analysis, and comparative analysis. Corruption, when examined through the lens of its multifaceted forms, reveals a complex interplay between visible actions and the underlying structures that sustain them. This interplay mirrors Hegel’s observation on the inseparability of form and content: the observable forms of corruption—bribery, nepotism, embezzlement—cannot be fully understood without examining the deeper socio-political and economic content that enables them. Conversely, the underlying motivations, such as the pursuit of power, accumulation of wealth, or maintenance of social status, inevitably shape the forms corruption takes in different cultural and institutional contexts (Gorsira, Denkers, & Huisman, 2018; Manara, Nübold, van Gils, & Zijlstra, 2023).

From a socio-political perspective, corruption often thrives in environments where informal networks—built on kinship, patron-client relationships, or shared regional and ethnic ties—supersede formal institutional arrangements. These informal systems may provide short-term benefits to participants but erode the principles of meritocracy, transparency, and equality over time. For instance, nepotism within public administration might secure employment for underqualified relatives, which not only undermines institutional efficiency but also entrenches loyalty to individuals rather than to the rule of law. Economically, the forms of corruption manifest differently depending on the structure of the market and the strength of regulatory oversight. In economies with high barriers to entry and weak legal enforcement, corruption may take the form of rent-seeking behavior, where actors manipulate the political or regulatory environment to secure economic rents without contributing to productivity. In more open and competitive economies, corruption might be subtler, involving collusion in public procurement, lobbying for favorable legislation, or manipulating financial regulations to benefit specific interest groups (Kubbe, Kırşanlı, & Nugroho, 2025; Wachs, Yasseri, Lengyel, & Kertész, 2019). The methodological framework employed in this study—synergistic approaches, generalization, dialectical methods, analysis and synthesis, retrospective analysis, and comparative analysis—allows for a comprehensive understanding of corruption’s dual nature as both a cause and consequence of institutional weakness.

1. **Synergistic approaches** enable the integration of insights from multiple disciplines, such as political science, sociology, economics, and law, to form a holistic picture of corruption’s dynamics. For example, political science may illuminate the power structures that enable corruption, while economics provides models to measure its impact on growth and inequality (Luna-Pla & Nicolás-Carlock, 2020).
2. **Generalization** facilitates the identification of overarching patterns from specific case studies, enabling scholars to develop typologies of corruption that are applicable across different contexts. For instance, differentiating between petty corruption, grand corruption, and systemic corruption helps in tailoring anti-corruption strategies to specific contexts (Kertész & Wachs, 2021).
3. **Dialectical methods** allow for the exploration of contradictions inherent in anti-corruption efforts. For example, increasing transparency might initially expose more cases of corruption, which could paradoxically reduce public trust before ultimately strengthening institutions. Understanding these contradictions is crucial for developing resilient policies.
4. **Analysis and synthesis** involve deconstructing corruption into its constituent elements—such as actors, incentives, opportunities, and constraints—and then recombining these elements into a coherent framework. This process helps in mapping the causal chains that link specific corrupt acts to broader institutional and societal outcomes.

5. **Retrospective analysis** provides historical depth, illustrating how corruption patterns evolve over time in response to changes in political regimes, economic structures, and social norms. For example, post-authoritarian transitions often experience surges in corruption due to weakened institutions and competing power centers.
6. **Comparative analysis** enables the identification of similarities and differences in corruption across countries or regions, offering insights into the effectiveness of different anti-corruption measures. For instance, comparing the anti-corruption models of Singapore, with its strong enforcement and low tolerance for misconduct, and Italy, where corruption has been more persistent despite legal reforms, can yield valuable lessons.
- 7.

Moreover, the classification of corruption forms is not merely an academic exercise; it has practical implications for policy-making. Without clear distinctions between types of corruption, governments risk applying generic solutions that fail to address the specific mechanisms at play. For example, measures aimed at reducing petty corruption—such as digitizing public services—might have little impact on grand corruption involving political elites and corporate actors. Cultural factors also play a critical role in shaping both the perception and manifestation of corruption. In some societies, gift-giving to officials may be seen as a cultural norm rather than a corrupt act, blurring the lines between acceptable social behavior and legal violations. Understanding these cultural nuances is essential for designing anti-corruption campaigns that resonate with local populations (Abbink, Freidin, Gangadharan, & Moro, 2018; Albanese Jay & Artello, 2019; Graycar & Jancsics, 2017).

#### 4. Results and discussions

It is important to note that high-level corruption is often divided according to the strategy of behavior of social groups: state grabs and business takeovers. The first term usually refers to a strategy of corporate and individual business behavior that aims to establish shadow control over decision-making at the highest levels of government. The second is a set of government strategies and tactics that seek to establish control of business in order to obtain an administrative annuity through the state, through its representatives. Corruption carried out as state usurpation is the actions of various citizens (they can be carried out by individuals, groups and firms) aimed at influencing the formation of laws, rules and norms in order to provide certain advantages for themselves as a result of granting certain privileges to public officials (Shamsutdinova, 2024). The types of state takeovers may vary by type, such as institutions to be captured or entities engaged in similar captures. In addition, in general, what is important here is that all forms of extortion by the state are primarily aimed at obtaining income from the state for a narrow circle of individuals with the help of subversion of the legal environment and possible large losses for society (Durkheim, 2005). In relation to corruption as it relates to business takeovers, it is important to note that the main tactics for its implementation are “the erection of administrative barriers, insistence on participation, individual corrupt practices” (Durkheim, 2019). Setting up administrative barriers means adopting certain regulations that help increase business costs. Extortion to participate implies that there is an opportunity in power to cause a particular harm to a particular enterprise, organization by virtue of its own resources and legal authority, thereby compelling it to contribute to various non-governmental or extra-budgetary funds. In return, the entrepreneur gets the opportunity to keep his business or to get all sorts of benefits and privileges. Individual corrupt practices of an individual involve the implementation of criminal interactions between businesses and individuals for personal gain using the official’s official position.

Business corruption occurs when entrepreneurs try to somehow solve the problems of running their business (Musheshe, 1994). The need to settle through registration, licensing, taxes, customs, etc., in the shortest possible time, with a faster or incomplete set of documents than competitors, often forces entrepreneurs to resort to informal relationships. Such a classification by types of corruption makes it possible to fully understand its essence, as well as to identify the most dangerous vectors from the point of view of the prevalence of corruption and the directions of society’s activities. An attempt is made to identify and identify the forms indicated in the proposed paragraph. Thus, in our opinion, most corrupt practices can take the form of intimacy, bribery, client-sponsorship relationships (or client-sponsorship), and lobbying. At the same time, we understand that it is impossible to narrow down the various corrupt practices to these four, but we do distinguish them as the basic, the most common. When

we speak of bribery, we mean such corrupt situation where there is a voluntary offer, promise, promise, giving, acceptance, consent to receive a certain amount of money in order to influence the actions of an official in his favor. Addiction is one of the oldest forms of corruption known to humankind. Citzerone also confronted her, describing use as the most criminal and most shameful incident (Akhmetova, 2008).

In the case of addiction, it is a solicitation of bribery that connects citizens. This corrupt practice is constructed as an exchange relationship to be carried out by an official and a corrupt agent in order to satisfy any interest of both participants by violating official procedures, in which the main thing is what is offered and what is required. Thus, there is a typical exchange in which the service is paid directly. In other words, when a corrupt person is bribed, just like a corrupt person, it does not matter how the person deals with him. For him, it is important not as a subject, but only as an object, as something it can give. Compared to other forms of corruption, bribery appears to be its most cynical and dangerous manifestation: as a result of criminal prosecution it is dangerous both for people with whom they interact and for society as a whole, because it is the least “moral” practice, and also discredits public authorities and its representatives, increasing disregard for the law.

The range of situations in which we use the practice under study is very wide. In addition, it is correlates with the fact that friendships or long-term relationships are not necessarily binding with use. In such a situation, individuals enter into economic relations only. It is important to note that this type of corruption mainly belongs to the widely understood middle class. In the upper class, money is not really needed at the very least, and although you can “buy” someone, but only on condition of paying a large amount of bribes, therefore, it will be necessary to negotiate with him. We can observe a similar situation among representatives of the lower levels of the social hierarchy, but here the reason is much the opposite: the lack of the necessary funds for bribery excludes such a possibility. Secondly, bribery always involves a conflict of interest. The corrupt expects him to be rewarded for doing anything he does not do without “compensation”. It is important that the amount of “compensation” for a corrupt agent is not too high and does not exceed at least the need for the service provided.

Bribery in the modern sense, emerging from neoliberal theories of corruption studies, can be analyzed in two ways: first, as an economic incentive for the official, and second, as a way to reduce costs. In the first case, the applicant, who values his time, will seek to pay bribes in order to expedite the resolution of his issue (Safarova, 2024). Bribery here is perceived as necessary by both participants in this pattern of corrupt practices and is seen as an incentive for an official to respond quickly. “A number of researchers have proposed economic models in which bribes may play a beneficial incentive role. For example, bribing “queue managers” can be effective. The material reward may encourage public officials to give preference to people who value their time as well as generally strive to work productively” [1]. In other words, with the help of bribes, the motivation of low-paid officials increases, due to which companies or individuals can conduct their business relatively calmly. However, at the same time, officials, seeing a direct economic benefit from taking bribes, can sometimes voluntarily adjust the activities and their powers to correct them. Such officials can artificially create shortages, engage in delays, and create various obstacles to accepting bribes from their clients.

In this connection, we note that the large amount of funds often used in corrupt interventions is not unreasonably related to the low salaries of officials. Thus, one of the means to increase the efficiency of public bodies, increase their attractiveness in terms of employment, as well as to combat negative corruption phenomena in Sweden, was to increase the salaries of civil servants by 12-15 times compared to the national average. In a second sense, bribes can be seen as an illegal way to reduce costs. The logic of this phenomenon is as follows: “the state sets the rules of economic activity and collects taxes. Individuals and companies can exempt themselves from the costs at a fee”. There are certain rules designed to regulate the activities of individuals, organizations, states, and officials to control these rules. Accordingly appears to be-free options.

## **5. Conclusion**

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As a result of bribery, the actor seeks certain things – privileges, certain advantages over other actors. The rules of regulation against the bribe do not allow it, and the rules will be broken, or at least not as strict as they are. “We have learned to circumvent formal norms quickly and effectively, and returning to the formal norms space turns out to be a difficult and lengthy process”. In addition, legal schemes are being replaced by semi-legal schemes because “costs need to be reduced in order to remain in the market, and this includes abandoning legal schemes or using parallel schemes of varying degrees of legality”. Thus, we can talk about the effect of Sorokin’s negative selection mechanism, that is, illegal business schemes replace legitimate ones, and unscrupulous market participants become more viable than honest ones. This phenomenon demonstrates how corruption, once entrenched, creates a self-reinforcing cycle that disadvantages ethical actors and rewards those willing to exploit legal loopholes. Over time, this dynamic reshapes the competitive landscape, as honest businesses either adapt to the prevailing corrupt environment or risk being driven out of the market altogether. In this context, the concept of Sorokin’s negative selection becomes a powerful analytical lens: it is not merely that corruption exists alongside legitimate practices, but that it actively displaces them, normalizing behavior that undermines the integrity of both economic and legal systems.

From a governance perspective, this negative selection effect erodes institutional trust. When citizens perceive that unethical actors consistently outperform honest ones, faith in the fairness and impartiality of legal and economic frameworks diminishes. This perception can lead to a form of civic fatalism, where individuals rationalize their own participation in corrupt practices as a necessary adaptation to survive in an unfair system. As these attitudes spread, the social stigma attached to corruption weakens, further entrenching the cycle. Economically, the prevalence of semi-legal or illegal schemes reduces the efficiency of resource allocation. Instead of investing in innovation, quality improvement, or fair competition, firms may channel resources into securing favorable treatment through bribery, lobbying, or manipulation of regulatory processes. This misallocation not only undermines long-term productivity growth but can also deter foreign investment, as external stakeholders perceive heightened risks in markets dominated by opaque and unpredictable rules.

The transition back to formal norms is further complicated by the vested interests of those who benefit from the existing corrupt arrangements. These actors often occupy strategic positions within both the public and private sectors, enabling them to influence policy decisions and enforcement priorities in ways that protect their advantages. In many cases, efforts to re-establish the primacy of formal legal frameworks are met with resistance, ranging from subtle bureaucratic obstruction to overt political opposition. Addressing the negative selection effect requires more than legal reform; it demands a coordinated strategy that targets both the supply and demand sides of corruption. On the supply side, strengthening enforcement mechanisms, protecting whistleblowers, and closing legal loopholes can reduce opportunities for corrupt behavior. On the demand side, fostering a culture of integrity through education, public awareness campaigns, and visible leadership commitment can help rebuild the social and moral norms that discourage corruption. Only through sustained, multi-faceted interventions can societies hope to reverse the corrosive dynamics that allow unscrupulous actors to thrive at the expense of honest participants.

## **5.2 Suggestion**

Combating corruption requires a multi-dimensional approach addressing structural, cultural, and economic factors. Governments should strengthen institutions through transparent procurement, merit-based recruitment, and independent oversight bodies with adequate resources. Cultural change is essential, achieved through civic education, public awareness campaigns, and engagement with community leaders to align ethical norms with good governance principles. Economic reforms must reduce rent-seeking by promoting fair competition, transparent licensing, and SME support. Technology tools such as e-governance platforms, blockchain registries, and digital audit trails can enhance transparency but must be paired with effective monitoring. International cooperation is vital to combat cross-border corruption, money laundering, and illicit flows, through participation in UNCAC, FATF, and bilateral asset recovery agreements. Long-term success depends on sustained institutional capacity building, whistleblower protection, and fostering political cultures that reward integrity. Coordinated and context-specific measures can strengthen governance and restore public trust.



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