Purpose: This study examined whether Trump's Gaza Board of Peace, established under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, represents genuine multilateral peacebuilding or unilateralism disguised in the language of collective security. The research questioned whether formal Council endorsement is sufficient to guarantee substantive multilateral control over post-conflict governance in Gaza.

Research Methodology: The study adopted a qualitative documentary design, drawing on Security Council resolutions, official statements, scholarly literature, and contemporary policy reports published mainly between 2021 and 2026, and analyzed them through Collective Security Theory.

Results: Findings show that Resolution 2803 conferred procedural legitimacy on the Board without transferring genuine operational authority to the Council, that the Board's design, chairmanship, and implementation carry a distinctly Washington-centered imprint, and that Palestinian representation in the governance architecture remains marginal.

Conclusions: The Board of Peace exemplifies a broader pattern in which great-power initiatives obtain United Nations endorsement while retaining unilateral control over implementation, thereby weakening the Council's substantive gatekeeping role.

Limitations: The study relies on secondary documentary sources and covers an unfolding situation whose institutional practice may still change as events develop.

Contributions: The study extends Collective Security Theory to ad hoc, leader centered peace architectures and offers policy relevant recommendations for strengthening Security Council oversight, Palestinian agency, and accountability mechanisms in externally managed post-conflict governance.