CEO Political Connection, Shareholding and Financial Distress of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria

Published: Aug 9, 2024

Abstract:

Purpose: Prior studies conducted to investigate the issues of CEO political connection and shareholding on financial distress remain inconclusive. It is based on the above, that this study is set out to examine the effect of CEO political connection and shareholding on the financial distress of DMBs.

Methodology/approach: This study adopted an ex post facto research design based on the nature and the problem of the research. The study utilized annual financial data from quoted DMBs from 2012 to 2021. The data were subjected to diagnostic tests and the Hausman test selected the use of REM over the FEM for testing the hypotheses.

Results/findings: The main results show that CEOP (?=0.275582; p=0.7029) had a positive non-significant effect on financial distress; CEOS (?=-0.201171; p=0.0039) had a negative significant effect on financial distress.

Limitations: The study does not include other control variables such as firm size and firm leverage which can also affect financial distress.

Contribution: This research contributes first, from the focus on developing country settings is important from a theoretical and empirical standpoint because the findings help us comprehend how political connection and shareholding status of CEOs determine the distress score of the DMBs in the absence of a supportive corporate and legal framework.

Novelty: This study from the context of a developing nation with weak institutional governance, examines how CEO political connection and shareholding explain the financial distress score of the DMBs which prior studies have weakly examined.

Keywords:
1. CEO political connection
2. CEO shareholding
3. Financial Distress
Authors:
1 . Emmanuel Agbo
2 . Chinedu Egbunike
How to Cite
Agbo, E., & Egbunike, C. (2024). CEO Political Connection, Shareholding and Financial Distress of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria . International Journal of Financial, Accounting, and Management, 6(1), 135–149. https://doi.org/10.35912/ijfam.v6i1.1649

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Issue & Section
Author Biographies

Emmanuel Agbo, Veritas University Abuja, Nigeria

Accounting Department

Chinedu Egbunike, Nnamdi Azikiwe University

Department of Accountancy 

References

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    Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board structure and performance: evidence for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 243-267.

    Ahmad, N. H., & Ariff, M. (2007). Multi-country study of bank credit risk determinants. International Journal of Banking and Finance, 5(1), 135-152.

    Al-Tamimi, H., Hussein, A., Miniaoui, H., & Elkelish, W. W. (2015). Financial Risk and Islamic Banks' Performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 9(5), 103-112.

    Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), 277-297.

    Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research, conceptual, strategic and statistical consideration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1183.

    Batta, G., Sucre Heredia, R., & Weidenmier, M. (2014). Political connections and accounting quality under high expropriation risk. European Accounting Review, 23(4), 485-517.

    Blau, B. M., Brough, T. J., & Thomas, D. W. (2013). Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(8), 3007-3017.

    Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Saffar, W. (2008). Political connections of newly privatized firms. Journal of corporate finance, 14(5), 654-673.

    Brahma, S., Zhang, J., Boateng, A., & Nwafor, C. (2023). Political connection and M&A performance: Evidence from China. International Review of Economics & Finance, 85, 372-389.

    Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big business owners in politics. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2133-2168.

    Cao, X., Lemmon, M., Pan, X., Qian, M., & Tian, G. (2019). Political promotion, CEO incentives, and the relationship between pay and performance. Management Science, 65(7), 2947-2965.

    Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 554-580.

    Denga, D. I., & Ali, A. (1983). An introduction to research methods and statistics in education and social science (3rd ed). Rapid Educational Publishers.

    Duru, A., Iyengar, R. J., & Zampelli, E. M. (2016). The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: the moderating role of board independence. Journal of Business Research, 69(10), 4269-4277.

    Eissa, A. M., & Eliwa, Y. (2021). The effect of political connections on firm performance: Evidence from Egypt. Asian Review of Accounting, 29(3), 362-382.

    Faccio, M. (2010). Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis. Financial Management, 39(3), 905-928.

    Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., Mcconnell, J. J., Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & Mcconnell, J. J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.

    Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder-CEOs and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2), 439-466.

    Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2007). Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 330-357.

    Fisman, R., & Wang, Y. (2015). The mortality cost of political connections. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(4), 1346-1382.

    Ganguly, K., Mishra, A. K., & Platt, K. (2023). Do Political Connections Pay? Evidence from India. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-25.

    Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009). Do politically connected boards affect firm value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.

    Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2013). Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Review of Finance, 17(5), 1617-1648.

    Gujurati, D. N. (2004). Basic Econometrics (Fourth Ed). McGraw Hill.

    Ha, P. V., Frömmel, M., & Ntim, C. G. (2020). Political connection heterogeneity and firm value in Vietnam. Cogent Business & Management, 7(1), 1738202.

    Harianto, S. (2020). Political Connections, Internal Conflicts of Interest, Earnings Management, and Investment Inefficiency: Additional Evidence from Indonesia [Doctoral Thesis]. University of Hull.

    Hashmi, M. A., Brahmana, R. K., & Lau, E. (2018). Political connections, family firms and earnings quality. Management Research Review, 41(4), 414-432.

    Hidayati, W., & Diyanty, V. (2018). Pengaruh moderasi koneksi politik terhadap kepemilikan keluarga dan agresivitas pajak. Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Auditing Indonesia, 22(1), 46-60.

    Houston, J. F., Jiang, L., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2014). Political connections and the cost of bank loans. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(1), 193-243.

    Huang, H. W., Rose-Green, E., & Lee, C. C. (2014). CEO age and Financial reporting quality. Accounting Horizons, 26(4), 725-740.

    Islam, M. S. U., Wong, W. C., & Yusoff, M. Y. B. M. (2023). Types of political connections, election years, and firm performance in Pakistan: Moderating role of external monitoring. Cogent Business & Management, 10(2), 2224139.

    Jackowicz, K., Koz?owski, ?., & Mielcarz, P. (2014). Political connections and operational performance of non-financial firms: New evidence from Poland. Emerging Markets Review, 20, 109-135.

    Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., & Pye, A. (2014). Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(2), 347-372.

    Kargi, S. (2011). Credit Risk and Performance of Nigerian Banks. Ahmadu Bello University Zaria -Nigeria.

    Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005). Do lenders favour politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1371-1411.

    Kim, J. H., & Lee, J. H. (2021). How CEO political connections induce corporate social irresponsibility: An empirical study of tax avoidance in South Korea. Sustainability, 13(14), 7739.

    Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (1998). Interest-group competition and the organization of congress: Theory and evidence from financial services’ political action committees. American Economic Review, 88(5), 1163-1187.

    Limbach, P., Schmid, M., & Scholz, M. (2016). All Good Things Come to an End: CEO Tenure and Firm Value. 19th Annual Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (SGF). - Zürich.

    Liu, J., Uchida, K., & Gao, R. (2012). Political connections and the long-term stock performance of Chinese IPOs. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 22(4), 814-833.

    Li, Y., Wang, X., & Zhang, D. (2018). CEO’s Background Characteristics, Financing Preference and Firm Performance–Empirical Evidence From China’s A-Share Listed Companies. In Recent Developments in Data Science and Business Analytics: Proceedings of the International Conference on Data Science and Business Analytics (ICDSBA-2017) (pp. 193-208). Springer International Publishing.

    Lokanan, M., & Sharma, S. (2018). A fraud triangle analysis of the LIBOR fraud. Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, 10(2), 187-212.

    Lymbiko, M. R. (2015). The Effect Of Operational Risk Management Practices on the Financial Performance in Commercial Banks in Tanzania (An Unpublished MBA Project). University of Nairobi, Kenya.

    Maaloul, A., Chakroun, R., & Yahyaoui, S. (2018). The effect of political connections on companies’ performance and value: Evidence from Tunisian companies after the revolution. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, 8(2), 185-204.

    Miner, J. B. (2006). Organizational Behavior 2: Essential Theories of Process and Structure (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315702001

    Mio, C., Fasan, M., & Ros, A. (2016). Owners’ preferences for CEOs characteristics: Did the world change after the global financial crisis? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 16(1), 116-134.

    Nuswantara, D. A., Fachruzzaman Prameswari, R. D., Suyanto, R R., Hendrati, I. M., Rusdiyanto, R., & Hendrati, I. M. (2023). The role of political connection to moderate board size, woman on boards on financial distress. Cogent Business & Management, 10(1).

    Okere, W., Isiaka, M. A., & Ogunlowore, A. J. (2018). Risk Management and Financial Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. European Journal of Business, Economics and Accountancy, 6(2), 30-42.

    Olalekan, L. I., Olumide, M. L., & Irom, I. M. (2018). Financial Risk Management and Profitability: An empirical evidence from commercial banks in Nigeria. Journal of Management Sciences,16(2), 117-137.

    Oluwafemi, A. S., Israel, A. N., Simeon, O., & Olawale, O. (2013). Risk Management and financial performance of banks in Nigeria. IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM), 14(6), 52-56.

    Onali, E., Galiakhmetova, R., Molyneux, P., & Torluccio, G. (2016). CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 27, 89-117.

    Saeed, A., Belghitar, Y., & Clark, E. (2017). Political connections and firm operational efficiencies: Evidence from a developing country. Review of Managerial Science, 11(1), 191-224.

    Saidu, S. (2019). CEO characteristics and firm performance: focus on origin, education and ownership. Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, 9(1), 29.

    Samaila , I. A. (2014). Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality in the Nigeria Oil Marketing Industry (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). Bayero University, Kano.

    Sun, R., & Zou, G. (2021). Political connection, CEO gender, and firm performance. Journal of corporate finance, 71, 101918.

    Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2012). Corporate governance and risk management committee: The role of risk management and compensation committee. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1979895.

    Tu, G., Lin, B., & Liu, F. (2013). Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(2), 114-135.

    Ullah, S., Khan, S., Hussain, S., Alam, M., & Haroon, M. (2021). Political Connections, Family Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Emerging Economy. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 28(3), 471-487.

    Wang, Z., Chen, M. H., Chin, C. L., & Zheng, Q. (2017). Managerial ability, political connections, and fraudulent financial reporting in China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(2), 141-162.

    Wong, S. C. Y. (2004). Governance in SOEs: An integrated approach. Corporate Governance International, 7(2), 1-11.

    Wu, H., Li, S., Ying, S. X., & Chen, X. (2018). Politically connected CEOs, firm performance, and CEO pay. Journal of Business Research, 91, 169-180.

    Wu, S., Quan, X., & Xu, L. (2011). CEO power, disclosure quality and the variability of firm performance: evidence from China. Nankai Business Review International, 2(1), 79-97.

    Yulistyawati, N. K. A., Suardikha, I. M. S., & Sudana, I. P. (2019). The analysis of the factor that causes fraudulent financial reporting with fraud diamond. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Auditing Indonesia, 1-10.

    Zhang, X., Tang, G., & Lin, Z. (2016). Managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation–an empirical study from China. Chinese Management Studies, 10(1), 119-137.

  1. Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2005). Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18(4), 1403-1432.
  2. Adams, R. B., & Mehran, H. (2012). Bank board structure and performance: evidence for large bank holding companies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21(2), 243-267.
  3. Ahmad, N. H., & Ariff, M. (2007). Multi-country study of bank credit risk determinants. International Journal of Banking and Finance, 5(1), 135-152.
  4. Al-Tamimi, H., Hussein, A., Miniaoui, H., & Elkelish, W. W. (2015). Financial Risk and Islamic Banks' Performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 9(5), 103-112.
  5. Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The review of economic studies, 58(2), 277-297.
  6. Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research, conceptual, strategic and statistical consideration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1183.
  7. Batta, G., Sucre Heredia, R., & Weidenmier, M. (2014). Political connections and accounting quality under high expropriation risk. European Accounting Review, 23(4), 485-517.
  8. Blau, B. M., Brough, T. J., & Thomas, D. W. (2013). Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(8), 3007-3017.
  9. Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Saffar, W. (2008). Political connections of newly privatized firms. Journal of corporate finance, 14(5), 654-673.
  10. Brahma, S., Zhang, J., Boateng, A., & Nwafor, C. (2023). Political connection and M&A performance: Evidence from China. International Review of Economics & Finance, 85, 372-389.
  11. Bunkanwanicha, P., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2009). Big business owners in politics. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2133-2168.
  12. Cao, X., Lemmon, M., Pan, X., Qian, M., & Tian, G. (2019). Political promotion, CEO incentives, and the relationship between pay and performance. Management Science, 65(7), 2947-2965.
  13. Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008). Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), 554-580.
  14. Denga, D. I., & Ali, A. (1983). An introduction to research methods and statistics in education and social science (3rd ed). Rapid Educational Publishers.
  15. Duru, A., Iyengar, R. J., & Zampelli, E. M. (2016). The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: the moderating role of board independence. Journal of Business Research, 69(10), 4269-4277.
  16. Eissa, A. M., & Eliwa, Y. (2021). The effect of political connections on firm performance: Evidence from Egypt. Asian Review of Accounting, 29(3), 362-382.
  17. Faccio, M. (2010). Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-country analysis. Financial Management, 39(3), 905-928.
  18. Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., Mcconnell, J. J., Faccio, M., Masulis, R. W., & Mcconnell, J. J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2597-2635.
  19. Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder-CEOs and stock market performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2), 439-466.
  20. Fan, J. P., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2007). Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 330-357.
  21. Fisman, R., & Wang, Y. (2015). The mortality cost of political connections. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(4), 1346-1382.
  22. Ganguly, K., Mishra, A. K., & Platt, K. (2023). Do Political Connections Pay? Evidence from India. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 1-25.
  23. Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009). Do politically connected boards affect firm value? Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), 2331-2360.
  24. Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2013). Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Review of Finance, 17(5), 1617-1648.
  25. Gujurati, D. N. (2004). Basic Econometrics (Fourth Ed). McGraw Hill.
  26. Ha, P. V., Frömmel, M., & Ntim, C. G. (2020). Political connection heterogeneity and firm value in Vietnam. Cogent Business & Management, 7(1), 1738202.
  27. Harianto, S. (2020). Political Connections, Internal Conflicts of Interest, Earnings Management, and Investment Inefficiency: Additional Evidence from Indonesia [Doctoral Thesis]. University of Hull.
  28. Hashmi, M. A., Brahmana, R. K., & Lau, E. (2018). Political connections, family firms and earnings quality. Management Research Review, 41(4), 414-432.
  29. Hidayati, W., & Diyanty, V. (2018). Pengaruh moderasi koneksi politik terhadap kepemilikan keluarga dan agresivitas pajak. Jurnal Akuntansi Dan Auditing Indonesia, 22(1), 46-60.
  30. Houston, J. F., Jiang, L., Lin, C., & Ma, Y. (2014). Political connections and the cost of bank loans. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(1), 193-243.
  31. Huang, H. W., Rose-Green, E., & Lee, C. C. (2014). CEO age and Financial reporting quality. Accounting Horizons, 26(4), 725-740.
  32. Islam, M. S. U., Wong, W. C., & Yusoff, M. Y. B. M. (2023). Types of political connections, election years, and firm performance in Pakistan: Moderating role of external monitoring. Cogent Business & Management, 10(2), 2224139.
  33. Jackowicz, K., Koz?owski, ?., & Mielcarz, P. (2014). Political connections and operational performance of non-financial firms: New evidence from Poland. Emerging Markets Review, 20, 109-135.
  34. Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., & Pye, A. (2014). Interlocking directorships and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(2), 347-372.
  35. Kargi, S. (2011). Credit Risk and Performance of Nigerian Banks. Ahmadu Bello University Zaria -Nigeria.
  36. Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005). Do lenders favour politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1371-1411.
  37. Kim, J. H., & Lee, J. H. (2021). How CEO political connections induce corporate social irresponsibility: An empirical study of tax avoidance in South Korea. Sustainability, 13(14), 7739.
  38. Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (1998). Interest-group competition and the organization of congress: Theory and evidence from financial services’ political action committees. American Economic Review, 88(5), 1163-1187.
  39. Limbach, P., Schmid, M., & Scholz, M. (2016). All Good Things Come to an End: CEO Tenure and Firm Value. 19th Annual Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (SGF). - Zürich.
  40. Liu, J., Uchida, K., & Gao, R. (2012). Political connections and the long-term stock performance of Chinese IPOs. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 22(4), 814-833.
  41. Li, Y., Wang, X., & Zhang, D. (2018). CEO’s Background Characteristics, Financing Preference and Firm Performance–Empirical Evidence From China’s A-Share Listed Companies. In Recent Developments in Data Science and Business Analytics: Proceedings of the International Conference on Data Science and Business Analytics (ICDSBA-2017) (pp. 193-208). Springer International Publishing.
  42. Lokanan, M., & Sharma, S. (2018). A fraud triangle analysis of the LIBOR fraud. Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting, 10(2), 187-212.
  43. Lymbiko, M. R. (2015). The Effect Of Operational Risk Management Practices on the Financial Performance in Commercial Banks in Tanzania (An Unpublished MBA Project). University of Nairobi, Kenya.
  44. Maaloul, A., Chakroun, R., & Yahyaoui, S. (2018). The effect of political connections on companies’ performance and value: Evidence from Tunisian companies after the revolution. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, 8(2), 185-204.
  45. Miner, J. B. (2006). Organizational Behavior 2: Essential Theories of Process and Structure (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315702001
  46. Mio, C., Fasan, M., & Ros, A. (2016). Owners’ preferences for CEOs characteristics: Did the world change after the global financial crisis? Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 16(1), 116-134.
  47. Nuswantara, D. A., Fachruzzaman Prameswari, R. D., Suyanto, R R., Hendrati, I. M., Rusdiyanto, R., & Hendrati, I. M. (2023). The role of political connection to moderate board size, woman on boards on financial distress. Cogent Business & Management, 10(1).
  48. Okere, W., Isiaka, M. A., & Ogunlowore, A. J. (2018). Risk Management and Financial Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. European Journal of Business, Economics and Accountancy, 6(2), 30-42.
  49. Olalekan, L. I., Olumide, M. L., & Irom, I. M. (2018). Financial Risk Management and Profitability: An empirical evidence from commercial banks in Nigeria. Journal of Management Sciences,16(2), 117-137.
  50. Oluwafemi, A. S., Israel, A. N., Simeon, O., & Olawale, O. (2013). Risk Management and financial performance of banks in Nigeria. IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM), 14(6), 52-56.
  51. Onali, E., Galiakhmetova, R., Molyneux, P., & Torluccio, G. (2016). CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 27, 89-117.
  52. Saeed, A., Belghitar, Y., & Clark, E. (2017). Political connections and firm operational efficiencies: Evidence from a developing country. Review of Managerial Science, 11(1), 191-224.
  53. Saidu, S. (2019). CEO characteristics and firm performance: focus on origin, education and ownership. Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, 9(1), 29.
  54. Samaila , I. A. (2014). Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Quality in the Nigeria Oil Marketing Industry (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis). Bayero University, Kano.
  55. Sun, R., & Zou, G. (2021). Political connection, CEO gender, and firm performance. Journal of corporate finance, 71, 101918.
  56. Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2012). Corporate governance and risk management committee: The role of risk management and compensation committee. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1979895.
  57. Tu, G., Lin, B., & Liu, F. (2013). Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(2), 114-135.
  58. Ullah, S., Khan, S., Hussain, S., Alam, M., & Haroon, M. (2021). Political Connections, Family Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Emerging Economy. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 28(3), 471-487.
  59. Wang, Z., Chen, M. H., Chin, C. L., & Zheng, Q. (2017). Managerial ability, political connections, and fraudulent financial reporting in China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(2), 141-162.
  60. Wong, S. C. Y. (2004). Governance in SOEs: An integrated approach. Corporate Governance International, 7(2), 1-11.
  61. Wu, H., Li, S., Ying, S. X., & Chen, X. (2018). Politically connected CEOs, firm performance, and CEO pay. Journal of Business Research, 91, 169-180.
  62. Wu, S., Quan, X., & Xu, L. (2011). CEO power, disclosure quality and the variability of firm performance: evidence from China. Nankai Business Review International, 2(1), 79-97.
  63. Yulistyawati, N. K. A., Suardikha, I. M. S., & Sudana, I. P. (2019). The analysis of the factor that causes fraudulent financial reporting with fraud diamond. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Auditing Indonesia, 1-10.
  64. Zhang, X., Tang, G., & Lin, Z. (2016). Managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation–an empirical study from China. Chinese Management Studies, 10(1), 119-137.